SSH and AKA are recent, practical protocols for secure connections over an otherwise unprotected network. This paper shows that, despite the use of public-key cryptography, SSH and AKA do not provide authentication as intended. The aws of SSH and AKA can be viewed as the result of their disregarding a basic principle for the design of sound authentication protocols: the principle that messages should be explicit.
Introduction
SSH and AKA are two recent, practical protocols for secure connections over an otherwise unprotected network Yl o96a, SSH96]; for example, they enable users to log into remote hosts. Both of the protocols rely on public-key cryptography for authentication (speci cally, on RSA RSA78]). In addition to authentication, each of the protocols has other signi cant goals, such as con dentiality. This paper presents attacks on both of the protocols: it shows that SSH allows clients to be impersonated, while AKA allows servers to be impersonated. These attacks concern the SSH protocol as speci ed in the June 1996 Internet draft Yl o96b], and the AKA protocol presented in the paper that introduces AKA SSH96] . SSH is widely used; the version deployed is fortunately not that of the Internet draft.
The common weakness of SSH and AKA is the lack of explicitness in messages. Speci cally, the signed statements of the protocols do not include some information that may be presumed obvious from context. The absence of this information opens the door to the attacks.
These attacks should not be very surprising|in particular, Needham and the author have described a few similar ones AN96]. Beyond documenting the attacks on SSH and AKA, the purpose of this paper is to provide additional evidence in favor of the following basic principle:
Every 
SSH
The SSH protocol has several options. Here we discuss only the case in which the client is authenticated using public-key cryptography. In this case, the protocol is: It also includes a hash of the previous messages, as a tie to the protocol run.
In Message 5, A provides its name and public key, and signs its name and the nonces. This message is protected by shared-key encryption with a key K 0 derived from K, N A , and N B .
A basic weakness in this protocol is that A's signed statement fH(A; N A ; N B )g K ?1
A does not contain enough information explicitly. The statement is intended to imply that K, N A , and N B can be used as the basis for a session between A and B; however, there is no trace of B or K in the statement. This weakness permits an attack.
In the attack, a server C with public keys K Ch and K Cs is able to impersonate A in a session with B. The attack is possible whenever A starts a session with C. When this happens, C immediately starts a session with B, making sure that the nonces are the same in both sessions; so C is able to use A's signed statement in the session with B. This attack can be prevented in the usual manner: B should sign more information. As in SSH, such additions have recently been made.
Conclusion
The attacks on SSH and AKA exploit a frequent weakness: the absence of su cient information in signed statements. Hopefully, these attacks will remind the designers of future protocols that it is generally prudent to include all relevant elds in signed statements, and that it is probably better to err on the side of including too much rather than too little.
As an extreme example, certain signed statements in the SSL v3.0 protocol include hashes of all previous messages FKK96]. These hashes impede attacks analogous to those described in this paper, found by the author on drafts of SSL v3.0 and of an earlier version of SSL. The SSL approach seems rather e ective. Although the SSL approach can be applied to many other protocols without much thought, it is always preferable to think carefully about the meaning of signed statements.
